Short pieces on continuing airworthiness, technical records and the parts of this work that software usually gets wrong. Written by the people building the platform.
Four articles. Each one describes a rule the platform actually enforces, not a position we would like to hold.
Why we stopped buying tools and built one operation instead: how five disconnected systems produce four answers to the same question, and what one shared aircraft record changes about every module since.
Four answers to one question means four wrong answers.
Due today and overdue are different states, and software that merges them will eventually ground an aircraft that was never out of limits.
Due today is not overdue. The difference is one operator and one grounded aircraft.
When one operator runs several legal entities, a shared workspace becomes a channel between them unless somebody decides, field by field, what crosses.
A shared container with unfiltered contents is a leak with a good interface.
A scanned document attached to a record is not evidence until somebody can say what it shows, where it came from, and which aircraft it belongs to.
A file attached to a record is not evidence until someone can say what it shows.